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LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Ms. Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State of the United States of America, published an article in The New York Times in its issue of 17 August 1998 concerning Iraq's relations with the United Nations and the Security Council, and the role of the United States in those relations. The article, which was a statement of the policy of the United States towards Iraq in the United Nations, contained a very serious distortion of the facts. It is therefore necessary to inform the members of the Security Council of the truth of the matter, which is as follows:

1. Ms. Albright states that the present confrontation is between Iraq and the United Nations and goes on to say: "... if [the Secretary-General and the Security Council] fail to persuade [Saddam Hussein] to back down, we will have laid the foundation for taking our own decisive action". Ms. Albright was evidently hinting that her country would use the United Nations as a means of putting into effect its own hostile plans with respect to Iraq and, if that failed, the United States would take power into its own hands and use force against Iraq. Ms. Albright made that clear on 14 August 1998 when she said in the course of a joint press conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan: "Let me ... make it clear that if necessary we will use force [against Iraq] on our timetable in response to threats at a time and place of our choosing." This blatant threat to use force against a State Member of the United Nations confirms once again that the United States will use the international machinery as a means of attaining its own interests and that, where the international machinery is in conflict with those interests, the United States will ride roughshod over the international machinery.
2. Ms. Albright has said that, on 4 August, she consulted with Mr. Butler, the Chairman of the Special Commission, about not carrying out the intrusive inspections after Iraq's decision on that day to suspend inspections.

Everybody is aware that Iraq decided to suspend cooperation with the inspections carried out by the Special Commission on 5 August and not on 4 August. Consequently, her consultation with Mr. Butler took place prior to Iraq's decision and her admission that such consultation took place confirms the information given in The Washington Post on 14 August 1998 to the effect that



Mr. Butler, the Chairman of the Special Commission, had had a conversation with her over a secure telephone line in the embassy of the United States in Bahrain, about matters related to the operational activities of the Special Commission. This affirmation deprives of any credibility the statement made by Mr. Butler on 14 August in which he denied that he had been given direction with respect to his decisions on operational matters and confirms that the Special Commission is subject to United States influence, even down to the smallest details of its day-to-day activities.

3. As part of her attempts to obscure the truth of the tragic effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people, Ms. Albright claims that the "ration basket" received by Iraqis under the oil-for-food programme is equal in calorific value to the intake of the average United States citizen.

This perversion of the facts reminds us of her statement several months ago to the effect that the Iraqi presidential sites were used for the production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. In answer to her allegation we only have to refer to two paragraphs of the report of the Secretary-General dated 1 February 1998 concerning the status of the implementation of the oil-for-food programme (S/1998/90). It says in paragraph 29: "Surveys by United Nations agencies and programmes continue to show that the nutritional situation of the Iraqi population is below internationally accepted standards." Paragraph 31 of the report says: "Further consideration of the nutritional requirements of the Iraqi population by United Nations nutritional experts has concluded that the target level was too low to provide the requisite nutritional security."

4. Ms. Albright says that the United States has successfully contained the Iraqi leadership for seven years by keeping in place the toughest multilateral sanctions in history.

We appeal to the intelligence of the members of the Security Council and ask: Is it permissible for a State that is a permanent member of the Council to say that it has maintained the toughest multilateral sanctions in history because it has a score to settle with the Iraqi leadership? Is it permissible for that to be done in the name of the members of the Council and in the name of the international community? We also wish to correct Ms. Albright's figures and to point out that the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq have been in place for eight years and not seven, since they began on 6 August 1990; at the time when Ms. Albright wrote her article the sanctions had already been in place for 8 years and 11 days.

5. We also wish to correct a final mistake by Ms. Albright, which does not appear to be political, by pointing out that Mr. Tariq Aziz is Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq and not Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 19 August 1998 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. It concerns the irresponsible practices of the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), which have had the effect of impeding the processing and approval of contracts for the purchase of spare parts and supplies for the oil sector and consequently of reducing Iraq's anticipated revenues for phase IV of the oil-for-food programme.

I hope that the Council will accord this important matter the attention it deserves and that it will consider it when it next meets for consultations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Letter dated 19 August 1998 from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President
of the Security Council

During the visit to Baghdad of Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadan, Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq, held a meeting with him on the morning of Monday, 23 February 1998, at which ways of implementing Security Council resolution 1153 (1998) were discussed. The Vice-President stressed, inter alia, the critical condition of infrastructure for the production, processing and transportation of Iraqi oil, which was such that it was not possible under any circumstances, given the sharp drop in the price of oil, to guarantee its ability to increase production sufficiently to realize the increased sum of 5.2 billion dollars stipulated in the resolution without the rapid allocation of funds for the repair of such infrastructure. He also stated that, even in the event that spare parts and supplies for the repair of production, processing and exportation infrastructure became available quickly, we would not be able to realize the total mentioned and the value of exports would perhaps be between 3 and 3.5 billion dollars. In addition to the allocation of sufficient sums to cover the cost of spare parts, he also asked that the 661 Committee should give sufficient attention to facilitating the approval of contracts relating to the requirements of the oil-related infrastructure.

Since that time, a technical team came to Iraq from the Saybolt company, and it submitted a report to the Secretary-General in early April 1998 which he transmitted to the Security Council with his report dated 15 April 1998 (S/1998/330, annex). In both reports, the Security Council was assured that the quantities of spare parts and supplies being sought in order to maintain and increase production represented the reasonable minimum, and it was noted that the production levels determined by Iraq were optimistic even if supplies were made available on schedule.

Nearly three months have passed since the fourth (enhanced) procurement and distribution plan took effect, and nearly two months since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1175 (1998). However, no decision has yet been reached in the 661 Committee on a procedure for the rapid approval of contracts for the purchase of spare parts and supplies for the oil sector and no method has been adopted for financing these contracts against assured future revenues, despite the fact that specific provision is made for these two measures in paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 1175 (1998). In the meantime, even before the adoption of that resolution, the relevant agencies of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil had concluded more than 50 contracts, valued at some 30 million dollars, with suppliers. Immediately the resolution was adopted, the companies concerned registered the contracts with the secretariat of the 661 Committee. At the moment, more than 37 contracts have thus accumulated with the Committee secretariat, and it subjects them to the same old regular, routine and plodding mechanism for registration, circulation and approval. No special, accelerated mechanism has been developed to process these contracts, as requested by the Council in its resolution 1175 (1998). This is because of the intransigent

position taken by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee, who do everything in their power to obstruct agreement on the use of a mechanism that accords with the provisions of the resolution. The following list shows the status of the contracts in question as of 14 August 1998:

Registered with the Committee secretariat:	37
Circulated to Committee members:	14
Approved by the Committee:	7
Placed on hold by the representative of the United States:	5

The irresponsible practices in which these two representatives engage not only obstruct the work of the 661 Committee but also cause great delay in the provision of the spare parts and supplies required for the repair and maintenance of production, processing and transportation infrastructure. When these tendentious practices and the delayed performance of contracts coincide with a continuing collapse in crude-oil prices on the world market, the inevitable result is to reduce Iraq's anticipated revenues for phase IV to around 3 billion dollars at best. This will force the relevant agencies of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to reduce the quantities stipulated in oil contracts already concluded, because those quantities were determined in the expectation that the spare parts and supplies required would be delivered on schedule. It will also have an adverse impact on the quantities of humanitarian goods and supplies for which contracts have already been concluded, thus making it uncertain whether the enhanced procurement and distribution plan can be implemented. Failure to implement the plan would be incompatible with the purposes of resolution 1153 (1998), in which the Council endorses the Secretary-General's recommendations to it for the mitigation of the grievous humanitarian situation in which our people finds itself.

Responsibility for this reduction in revenues falls on the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, because they are violating the letter and spirit of resolutions 1153 (1998) and 1175 (1998). Since efforts to address this question first began in February 1998, these two Governments have constantly striven to oppose the endeavours of the other members of the 661 Committee to elaborate a formula or procedure that would help to expedite the processing of contracts and the provision of spare parts and supplies to the oil sector.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, in bringing these facts to your attention, urges you to intervene directly with the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom with a view to inducing them to desist from obstructing the processing of contracts for the purchase of spare parts and supplies for the oil sector and so that the 661 Committee can expedite the elaboration of an accelerated procedure for the approval of such contracts and introduce the necessary mechanism for their immediate financing against assured future revenues in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1175 (1998).

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S/1998/782
English
Page 4

We request you to raise the matter of the present letter when the Security Council next meets for consultations and to have it circulated as a Council document.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq



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SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1182 (1998) of 14 July 1998, by which the Council urged me to provide, as soon as possible, recommendations for United Nations assistance for the legislative election process in the Central African Republic.

2. In paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Security Council called upon the authorities of the Central African Republic to adopt rapidly an operational plan for the organization of legislative elections, and so enable the United Nations and international organizations to make arrangements for the provision of necessary assistance. Since that plan was adopted on 6 August 1998, I am now in a position to submit recommendations on a possible United Nations role in the legislative election process. The present report also provides an update on electoral developments since my report of 19 June 1998 (S/1998/540) on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).

II. ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS

Institutional aspects

3. As indicated in my report of 19 June 1998, the Commission électorale mixte et indépendante (CEMI) was formally established by a decree on 28 May 1998. However, the Electoral Commission was not able promptly to begin its work, owing to differences among the political parties over its composition. In an effort to reconcile their respective positions, my Special Representative, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, convened a meeting of political parties on 16 June, together with the two members of the Group of Friends of the Central African Republic represented in Bangui, the ambassadors of France and of the United States of America. After protracted discussions, a consensus was finally reached on the chairmanship, Bureau and composition of the Electoral Commission, including a compromise formula for the sharing, among all main political parties, of posts in the CEMI Bureau.



4. Accordingly, President Ange-Félix Patassé signed a revised decree on the composition of the Electoral Commission on 18 June. The CEMI members were sworn in and the Commission held its first session on the following day, under the chairmanship of Mr. Michel Adama-Tamboux. Draft rules of procedure were adopted by the CEMI Bureau on 26 June and formally adopted by the Commission in plenary on the same day. The rules provide for the establishment of six technical subcommissions dealing with the following issues: finance; materials and logistics; voters lists and voter cards; candidacy, information and training; polling stations and counting centres; and security.

5. As indicated in my previous report, President Patassé initially decided to hold the legislative elections on 16 and 30 August 1998. However, the Electoral Commission, in keeping with the Electoral Code, proposed to hold the elections in September 1998. As a result, President Patassé signed a decree on 8 July setting the date of the first round of elections for 20 September 1998, with an electoral campaign from 5 to 18 September. The second round, which is to take place three weeks after the first, was thus set for 11 October.

6. On 24 July, the President signed and promulgated a law on electoral redistricting, as adopted by the National Assembly two weeks earlier. Article one of that law increased by 24 the previous number of deputies in the National Assembly for a total of 133 (representing 109 electoral districts). Article two set the following criteria for determining the number of districts: for Bangui, there would be one deputy per 65,000 inhabitants, and for the provinces, one per 40,000. A presidential decree establishing the electoral districts was signed on 31 July. However, both the law and the decree are being contested by the opposition parties as unconstitutional; the case is being considered by the Constitutional Court. For planning purposes, the Electoral Commission will need to know the exact number of deputies to be elected and the final electoral mapping as soon as possible.

Budgetary aspects

7. On 17 July, following several meetings with key donors, the Electoral Commission adopted a budget of \$3.2 million, compared to initial estimates of about \$4.4 million. At donors' meetings held in Bangui on 23 and 31 July, France pledged a contribution of FF 7 million (38 per cent of the total budget), while the European Union announced a contribution of 534 million CFA francs. Those contributions are to finance the production and transportation of electoral materials and equipment and the updating of the electoral lists and voter cards, as well as supervisory missions, technical assistance and observation of elections. Japan also pledged to cover transportation costs (helicopter and fuel) for the distribution and retrieval of electoral materials and equipment throughout the country, as well as the remuneration of poll workers. China announced a contribution in the form of 4 computers and 1,000 calculators. The United States was not in a position at the time to specify the amount of any pledge, but subsequently announced a contribution of \$50,000 for the printing of ballot papers and \$200,000 for the direct subcontracting of United States non-governmental organizations to promote electoral awareness and training, as well as observation activities. Canada pledged C\$ 100,000 (US\$ 66,000). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) confirmed that it would contribute \$500,000 for a technical assistance project in support of the

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electoral process, including training of electoral workers, voter education and technical support to the Electoral Commission.

8. The above pledges cover the budget of the Electoral Commission in full. While the European Union announced that its contribution to the CEMI budget would be bilateral in nature, Canada, France, Japan and the United States are channelling their contributions through the United Nations, under a cost-sharing project with UNDP.

Operational aspects

9. The Electoral Commission is now fully operational in Bangui, and most of its branches at the provincial level, the comités sous-préfectoraux, are also in place. However, the national coordination and operational activities of the Commission in preparation for the elections have been seriously impeded by the delay in the provision of necessary financial and other resources. In particular, supervisory missions to the provinces, a key step in the control and amendment of the electoral rolls, are far behind schedule, although the Office national informatique has made good progress in compiling the raw data.

10. According to the operational plan of the Electoral Commission (which was adopted and presented at the weekly donors' meeting on 6 August), a number of other key preparatory activities for the elections were, at the time of the drafting of the present report, five weeks behind schedule. They include a market survey for the procurement of ballot boxes and other electoral materials, the ordering of voter cards, the implementation of training programmes for poll workers and members of the comités sous-préfectoraux and the elaboration of a national logistic support plan for the distribution and retrieval of electoral materials throughout the country. With respect to the last item, in a letter to my Special Representative dated 31 July, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission requested United Nations assistance for the distribution and retrieval of electoral materials. The Chairman pointed out that this crucial element of electoral support had been provided by the French forces based in the Central African Republic during the 1993 elections. In this connection, it is pertinent to mention that donors, as well as the Friends of the Central African Republic in Bangui, expressed the view that the Mission's logistical support would be essential, as any alternative source, even if feasible, would be much more expensive.

11. On 7 August, President Patassé convened a meeting with donors, government officials, the Electoral Commission and MINURCA, at which the CEMI Chairman presented a progress report and indicated that, in view of the operational delays caused largely by the lack of resources, the elections might not be held as scheduled. However, President Patassé expressed the view that the election date of 20 September should be maintained. He also stressed that the ballot papers should be printed outside the country, a position that the Electoral Commission believed would further compound the delays in preparing the elections. On 14 August, the Electoral Commission met with President Patassé and subsequently announced in a press communiqué that it envisaged, for technical and legal reasons, a modification of the electoral calendar. The Commission also requested that the administrative authorities suspend the registration of candidatures until a new electoral calendar was established. At

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a meeting held with donors and UNDP on 18 August, the Commission indicated that it would not set a new date for the elections until its preparations, especially the checking of the electoral lists, were well advanced and the role to be played by the United Nations in the electoral process became clear.

United Nations activities

12. During the reporting period, MINURCA, in close collaboration with UNDP and the Friends of the Central African Republic in Bangui, continued to provide advice and technical assistance to the Central African authorities in the planning and organization of the elections. My Special Representative, in cooperation with UNDP, has been sensitizing the international community to the need to respond positively and quickly to the call by the Security Council, in its resolution 1182 (1998), to provide the international assistance necessary to support the organization of the elections. The MINURCA electoral experts worked closely with the Electoral Commission to assist in the development of its operational plan and budget and in the coordination of electoral activities. I wish to express my gratitude to those Member States and international organizations that have responded with generous contributions to the electoral budget.

13. MINURCA continued to place special emphasis on the dissemination of accurate information as a tool for national reconciliation and peace. In this spirit, my Special Representative continued to give regular press conferences and to hold meetings with a broad spectrum of the Central African civil society, as well as all the international agencies represented in Bangui. In addition, with a generous contribution from the Government of Denmark, a United Nations radio station, Radio MINURCA, was launched on 22 July and began live broadcasting on 27 July. Radio MINURCA has been featuring topics related to the mandate of MINURCA and, working closely with the MINURCA electoral unit and UNDP, has also featured topics on the electoral process, thus providing a major tool to inform voters on the various stages of the process. As the only independent voice capable of reaching the entire country, Radio MINURCA has already established itself as a vital source of objective and factual information.

14. During the reporting period, MINURCA also completed its reconnaissance missions to key locations in the interior of the country to assess the situation outside Bangui in order to facilitate preparations for the elections and to help formulate recommendations on a future United Nations role in the electoral process.

15. Among other activities that have a bearing on the electoral process, as suggested by my Special Representative to President Patassé, a joint Government-MINURCA committee was established to agree upon a programme for the restructuring of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) and to work out the modalities for its implementation. In addition, the civilian police component of MINURCA started its first one-month training session of 60 members of the national gendarmerie on 11 August. This would be followed immediately by a second one-month session, with a view to training at least 120 gendarmes before the elections.

III. POSSIBLE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

16. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1182 (1998) and given the developments described in the preceding section, an operational plan for possible United Nations assistance in the electoral process in the Central African Republic has been developed by MINURCA. The plan is based on a detailed assessment made by MINURCA, in close cooperation with UNDP and key donor countries. Subject to Security Council approval, and with the understanding that the ultimate responsibility for the organization and conduct of the legislative elections rests with the Electoral Commission, MINURCA could provide the following support:

(a) The transport of electoral materials and equipment to selected sites and to the sous-préfectures and their retrieval, as well as the transport of United Nations electoral observers to and from the selected sites;

(b) A limited but reliable international observation of the first and second rounds of the legislative elections;

(c) Ensuring the security of electoral materials and equipment during their transport to and at the selected sites, as well as the security of United Nations electoral observers.

Logistic support

17. According to the above plan, MINURCA would provide for the timely road and air (plane and helicopter) transport of electoral materials and equipment from Bangui to the 69 sous-préfectures of the Central African Republic and, exceptionally, to a few polling stations (from among the 2,500 in the country) that are inaccessible by road. The electoral materials and equipment would also be retrieved by MINURCA and returned to Bangui.

18. MINURCA would transport the electoral materials and equipment to the 15 sous-préfectures located near Bangui. For the provinces, the bulk of electoral materials and equipment would be transported by MINURCA to six selected sites (Bambari, Bangassou, Berberati, Bouar, Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé towns) by air, and delivered from those six sites to the remaining 54 sous-préfectures by road or air, as appropriate. All return trips from the sous-préfectures that are accessible by road would take place on the same day, thereby obviating the need to set up support structures there.

19. The local electoral authorities would be responsible for the distribution of electoral materials from the sous-préfectures to the polling stations (apart from the above-mentioned stations inaccessible by road), as well as within the city of Bangui.

20. The United Nations electoral observers, as described below, would also be transported by MINURCA from Bangui to the six selected sites and back.

International observation

21. MINURCA would conduct a limited observation of the legislative elections, in close cooperation with other international organizations that might be invited by the Electoral Commission. In this context, it is proposed that a total of 14 medium-term and 80 short-term electoral observers be deployed to monitor the elections and assess their results.

22. The medium-term observers, in seven two-member teams, would be deployed to Bangui and to the six selected sites outside the capital four weeks before the date of the first round of polling, for a total period of about two months. The medium-term observers, who would be recruited from among the United Nations Volunteers, would monitor the electoral preparations and plan for the arrival of the short-term observers. The short-term observers would join the medium-term observers two or three days before the first round of polling, to form a total of 47 teams composed of two observers each. Half of the short-term observers would be recruited locally from among international personnel (MINURCA, United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organizations and the diplomatic corps). The other half would be recruited from abroad (United Nations personnel and mission appointees). The short-term observers from abroad could leave two or three days after the first round, since only the 40 locally recruited short-term observers would be required to observe the second round and would join the 14 medium-term observers to form 27 two-observer teams.

23. Under this plan, it is estimated that the teams would be able to visit at least 25 per cent of the polling stations (i.e., about a dozen per team). Bangui and the six selected sites where the electoral observers would be deployed represent, respectively, 10 and 17 per cent of the polling stations nationwide, thus providing a credible sample of the overall electoral process.

Provision of security

24. On the basis of a careful review of the situation in the Central African Republic, two options have been developed. Under the first option, it is estimated that the security of the electoral material and observers outside Bangui would best be provided by a minimum of 450 troops. Of those, 150 current MINURCA troops would be temporarily redeployed from Bangui to the six selected provincial sites. The remaining 300 troops would have to be provided by troop-contributing countries, to supplement the current authorized strength of the military component of MINURCA. Subject to Security Council approval, it is estimated that 8 to 10 weeks would be required for the deployment of the proposed 450 troops and the necessary support materials to the six provincial sites.

25. Under the second option, a maximum of 250 current MINURCA troops would be temporarily redeployed to the six selected sites, complemented by 150 FACA troops, for a total strength of 400. During the period of deployment at the six selected sites, the 150 national troops would be under the operational control of MINURCA. An estimated period of six weeks would be required for the redeployment of the MINURCA and FACA troops. In that connection, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1182 (1998) concerning the restructuring of the national armed forces, the FACA elements that would

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cooperate with MINURCA could serve as the nucleus for the building of a republican, multi-ethnic Central African army.

26. Under both options, the troops would escort the electoral materials and equipment during their transport and retrieval as described in paragraphs 17 and 18 above. While ensuring security at the six provincial sites, the troops would escort and deliver the electoral materials to and from the sous-préfectures and the polling stations mentioned in paragraph 17. MINURCA would not provide for the security of electoral materials at any sous-préfecture or polling station outside those sites, since this would be the responsibility of the Central African authorities.

27. The deployment of troops under either option is based on the assumption that two platoon-sized elements of 30 to 40 personnel each would be required to provide security at each of the six selected sites. The troops would be deployed six weeks before the elections and would remain at those sites for about two and a half months. Should the Security Council approve a new mandate for MINURCA in support of the electoral process, the Mission's current rules of engagement would need to be reviewed to ensure consistency with the additional military tasks.

Financial requirements

28. The Mission's current air and road transportation assets, including contingent-owned equipment, would not be sufficient to support the deployment of and to sustain troops and observers outside Bangui, as well as to transport electoral materials and equipment to and from six provincial sites, 69 sous-préfectures and selected polling stations. The additional assets for the support of the Mission's deployed troops and observers would have to be funded from the MINURCA budget. The financial implications of these transportation and support assets, as well as the deployment of United Nations electoral observers and additional MINURCA troops under the two proposed options indicated in paragraphs 24 and 25 above, will be submitted shortly as an addendum to the present report. The cost of air and road transportation required for the delivery of electoral materials and equipment would be funded from the CEMI budget. It has been agreed with the donors concerned that their contributions would be administered by UNDP.

29. The deployment of 150 FACA troops to assist MINURCA outside Bangui, as proposed in paragraph 25 above, would need to be funded through voluntary contributions by Member States.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

30. As described in the present report, substantial progress has been made by the Central African authorities in the preparations for the 1998 legislative elections. The Electoral Commission has prepared a budget acceptable to all concerned, including key donors who have pledged the necessary funds. However, the operational activities of the Commission are well behind schedule, as it was only inaugurated in late June and the disbursement of critical funds only started in late July. As already noted, it recently became clear that more time

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would be required for completing the tasks defined in the CEMI operational plan. Accordingly, on 14 August, the Electoral Commission announced that the elections scheduled to be held on 20 September 1998 would have to be delayed. The Commission also indicated that it would set a new date for the elections after the completion of certain key preparatory steps and once the role it expects the United Nations to play in the electoral process has been determined.

31. In this context, it should be stressed that the ultimate responsibility for the organization and conduct of the legislative elections must rest with the Electoral Commission. Any proposed United Nations assistance can only be complementary to the Commission's work. It is therefore essential that the Electoral Commission take the measures necessary to ensure the timely delivery and retrieval of electoral material to all polling stations. It should also be stressed that the Central African authorities will be responsible for the maintenance of law and order throughout the country during the election process. In this connection, I am gratified that the training of the national gendarmerie has started and that a joint Government-MINURCA committee on the restructuring of the national armed forces has been established. The Government of the Central African Republic must continue to give priority attention to this issue, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1182 (1998).

32. With respect to the redeployment of MINURCA troops to the provinces, proposed in section III of the present report, it should be emphasized that the feasibility of such redeployment is predicated upon the assumption that the security situation during the electoral process in Bangui would remain stable. It should also be stressed, in this regard, that first option (see para. 24 above) would clearly be the preferred approach. This option would enable MINURCA to be in a better position to continue to assist in the maintenance of security in Bangui during the election process while, at the same time, ensuring security for the transport and retrieval of electoral material, as well as protection of the electoral observers at those sites. The second option (see para. 25 above) would not offer the same guarantees, since it would seriously weaken the Mission's presence in Bangui and would make it more difficult for it to respond effectively to security threats in the capital should they occur at any time during the election process.

33. With respect to the proposed international electoral observation (see paras. 21-23 above), the observation sites have been carefully selected, on the basis of population density, the number of polling stations in the area, the accessibility of the polling stations and security conditions, to provide a reliable picture of the conduct of the elections. Indeed, the monitoring of the electoral process in Bangui and the six selected sites would encompass at least 25 per cent of all polling stations nationwide. Based on the accumulated experience of the United Nations in electoral observation, this is considered to be a representative and credible percentage, which would enable my Special Representative to issue, at the end of the process, an overall assessment of the results of the legislative elections.

34. As noted in my last report (S/1998/540), MINURCA has succeeded since its establishment, on 15 April 1998, in maintaining security and stability in Bangui. At the same time, the Central African authorities, with the advice and support of my Special Representative, MINURCA and UNDP, have made significant

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progress in implementing the Bangui agreements and initiating major political and economic reforms. This includes the recent conclusion of an agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions to address the pressing economic and social difficulties facing the country. Nevertheless, the national reconciliation process and the security situation remain fragile. The holding of timely legislative elections, in accordance with acceptable international standards, would undoubtedly help to further the peace process and create a climate of stability in which financial and economic reforms can be vigorously pursued.

35. Should the Security Council decide to expand the mandate of MINURCA to include assistance to the election process in the Central African Republic as outlined above, this could play an essential role. It is clear that without the effective support of the United Nations and the international community, it would not be possible for the Central African Republic to hold the elections within a time-frame consistent with constitutional provisions, thereby undermining the achievements made so far in the national reconciliation and peace process.

36. I therefore recommend that the Security Council approve the proposals for United Nations assistance in the electoral process contained in section III above and modify the Mission's mandate accordingly. As regards the provision of security to the electoral observers and material during the election process, I further recommend that, for the reasons given in paragraph 32 above, the Council consider approving the first option. Finally, I should also like to urge all the Central African parties to assume fully their responsibilities in the elections and to participate in them in a manner that will strengthen the democratic process in the country and contribute to genuine national reconciliation.

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**SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**Addendum

1. As indicated in paragraph 28 of my main report, dated 21 August 1998, I wish to inform the Security Council that the costs for the transportation and support assets, as well as the deployment of United Nations electoral observers and additional United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) troops for a two-and-a-half-month period under the proposed options 1 and 2 indicated in paragraphs 24 and 25 of my main report would amount to \$6.3 million and \$3.8 million, respectively.
2. Option 1 provides for the deployment of an additional 300 troops to be deployed to the six selected provincial sites, together with 150 troops from the current MINURCA military component, for a total of 450 troops. They would need to be supported by 42 additional staff (24 international and 18 local staff). In addition, a total of 14 medium-term electoral observers would be required, to be deployed four weeks before the date of the first round of polling, for a total of two months. They would be followed by 80 short-term electoral observers, who would join the medium-term observers two or three days before the first round of polling.
3. Option 2 provides for the deployment of a maximum of 250 current MINURCA troops to the six selected sites, complemented by 150 Forces armées centrafricaines troops, for a total strength of 400 troops, to be supported by the same number of civilian personnel and electoral observers required under option 1.
4. A breakdown of the requirements of both options by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.
5. Should the Security Council decide to expand the mandate of MINURCA to include assistance to the electoral process in the Central African Republic, it would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the related cost should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.



Annex

Cost estimates for assistance to the electoral process in the
Central African Republic for a period of two and a half months

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Description	Option 1	Option 2
1. Military personnel costs	1 615.0	22.0
2. Civilian personnel costs	1 243.0	1 242.0
3. Premises/accommodations	50.0	42.0
4. Infrastructure repairs	65.0	65.0
5. Transport operations	276.0	252.0
6. Air operations	1 266.0	1 266.0
7. Naval operations	—	—
8. Communications	505.0	471.0
9. Other equipment	294.0	247.0
10. Supplies and services	202.0	104.0
11. Election-related supplies and services	—	—
12. Public information programmes	—	—
13. Training programmes	—	—
14. Mine-clearing programmes	—	—
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	—	—
16. Air surface and freight	720.0	5.0
17. Staff assessment	82.0	82.0
Total	6 318.0	3 798.0



Security Council

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the position of the Rwanda Government on the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Since 2 August 1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced instability characterized by a generalized rebellion pitting the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) against the leadership and the person of President Laurent Kabila.

Members of the Alliance and other Congolese accuse Mr. Kabila of, among other things:

- Incapacity and unwillingness to restore peace, security, unity and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the subregion;
- Deliberately promoting divisions within the Congolese National Army by forming private and tribally based militias;
- Repressive policies, targeting all democratic forces, characterized by collective massacres and assassinations, incarceration of political dissidents, discrimination and gross violations of human rights;
- Inciting violence and promoting ethnic hatred.

Clearly these accusations define the parameters of the Congolese crisis and demonstrate the internal and political nature of the conflict. Therefore, the accusation that Rwanda and other countries have invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a malicious and gratuitous lie. The state of war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is regrettable and that is why the Government of Rwanda urges all Congolese people to work towards a political solution. We call for an immediate ceasefire, followed by an all-party conference and the establishment of all-inclusive transitional institutions. This would give the Congolese people an opportunity to manage the crisis on their own and would bring about a quick end to the current instability.

Essentially there are two categories of stakeholders in the Congolese conflict. The principal stakeholders are the Congolese people themselves.

Peace and stability in the Congo is the primary responsibility of the Congolese people. As pointed out, they should be helped and encouraged to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The immediate neighbours and others, who constitute the second category, should be helping in this process. Stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo benefits not only that country, but also its neighbours and Rwanda in particular.

Unfortunately, certain States members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have decided to support President Kabila and not the Congolese people, by sending military forces to his rescue. This was done in total disregard of the 8 August 1998 Victoria Falls Summit decision to send a ministerial fact-finding mission to the region. The mission was pre-empted and its conclusions have been biased by the military decisions taken in Harare by the Ministers of Defence present on 18 August 1998. This pursuit of parallel initiatives by the same convenor is not only wrong in principle but is fraudulent in nature.

Other regional organizations such as the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) have long-standing security arrangements with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These should not be ignored.

Rwanda has a specific interest in the stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, arising from our own security concerns. These concerns stem from the presence of ex-Rwandan soldiers and Interahamwe militia and their continued use of the Congolese territory as a rear base to launch attacks against the people of Rwanda.

We wish to state that the problems of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not a preserve of SADC. Other countries, immediate neighbours of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as Uganda, Burundi, the Congo, Central African Republic and Rwanda, which are not necessarily SADC members, have a bigger stake in the stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo than most SADC member States. Therefore, all these countries should have been consulted.

The military involvement of certain SADC countries in the current crisis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly does not promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict. By its very nature, it can only serve the narrow interest of the leaders spearheading the intervention. It serves neither the interests of the Congolese people, nor those of the region as a whole.

Rwanda therefore reserves the right to get involved and to assist the Congolese people in their search for a lasting solution in whatever manner it deems appropriate.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gideon KAYINAMURA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations



General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda items 31, 33, 34, 40 and 42
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Identical letters dated 19 August 1998 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the
President of the Security Council

I wish to thank you for your participation in the third meeting between the United Nations and regional organizations, which recently took place in New York.

I am particularly pleased that we had an open and frank discussion and a constructive exchange of views on some of the most important issues affecting cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the field of conflict prevention. I have taken careful note of suggestions made for enhancing our interaction in this field.

I also welcome the emphasis that was placed at the meeting on the need for effective follow-up and the decision taken to convene a working level meeting between the United Nations and participating regional organizations, before the end of the year, to develop further the modalities for collaboration that we discussed.



In the meantime, I have the pleasure to enclose a copy of the summary statement I delivered at the concluding session of the meeting, which highlights some of the main points of our meeting.

It is clear to me that there will be a growing need for expanded and more effective cooperation in the field of conflict prevention between the United Nations and regional organizations, and I value the support of the General Assembly in this regard.

I would be grateful if the present letter and my concluding statement (see annex) could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 31, 33, 34, 40 and 42 of the fifty-second session, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Summary statement of the Secretary-General at the concluding session of the third meeting between the United Nations and regional organizations, held on 28 and 29 July 1998

1. I am very pleased that the third high-level meeting between the United Nations and regional organizations has successfully taken place at Headquarters. I am also gratified by the positive response to my invitation as reflected by your active participation here. I further welcome your support for my proposal to discuss "Cooperation for conflict prevention" as the theme of the meeting and the constructive spirit of dialogue that took place here.
2. I will now try to summarize my understanding of the discussions held at the meeting and to highlight some of the main points that appeared particularly significant to me.
3. The first two meetings, held in 1994 and 1996, focused on general principles and modalities to guide cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the field of international peace and security. Based on the understandings reached at the previous two meetings, this meeting examined the potential for greater interaction and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the field of conflict prevention within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and the mandates of regional organizations. In particular, we discussed the challenge of conflict prevention, reviewed how the United Nations and regional organizations are responding to meet this challenge and identified areas of possible future interaction and collaboration in this area.
4. In an era when the principal threat to human security is increasingly coming from new and more diverse forms of conflict, the challenge of conflict prevention goes to the very heart of the shared mission of the United Nations and regional organizations. To meet this challenge, the critical need to develop a culture of prevention and specific forms of action and interaction in this field was recognized. To this end, two distinct categories of cooperation were noted. First, we looked at "structural prevention", namely, the need to address the economic, social, ethnic and other root causes of conflict and to promote greater respect for human rights, maintenance of the rule of law and strengthening of democratic institutions. Then we discussed "operational prevention", which encompasses the traditional forms of conflict prevention and "early warning". In this context, it was noted that prevention is a continuum that ranges from early warning, through preventive diplomacy, preventive disarmament (in particular of small arms), preventive deployment and on to peace-building, both before and after conflicts.
5. It was further recognized that the United Nations and the regional organizations possess various strengths and capabilities in the area of conflict prevention and that the focus should now be placed on how these organizations can work together to achieve greater complementarity as mutually reinforcing institutions, making use of their comparative advantages. Since the United Nations and some regional organizations have recently established new mechanisms

for early warning and conflict prevention, there is an increasing need to share experiences in this field.

6. It was noted, in particular, that the key to conflict prevention lies with Member States and their support for early external involvement to defuse disputes and crises. In this regard, the value of a "rule based" approach to prevention was underscored, as it makes efforts to avoid conflicts more effective as well as more acceptable to the international community. This can be helpful in developing a culture of prevention, thereby overcoming the reluctance of some Governments to accept outside help on grounds of sovereignty. In this connection, several speakers emphasized the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support of increased efforts in the field of conflict prevention.

7. The United Nations and regional organizations affirmed their common commitment to developing specific modalities for more effective cooperation in the field of conflict prevention that are practical and implementable. All representatives present placed great emphasis on the need to make this a reality by ensuring practical follow-up to the meeting. While recognizing that no single model of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations will cover all eventualities, various possible modalities for cooperation were considered, including: measures for more regular consultation at the Headquarters level, including in the context of early warning; more systematic coordination of preventive activities in the field, including joint missions as appropriate; development of common indicators for early warning; establishment of a database of the conflict prevention capabilities of the United Nations and regional organizations; better flow of information; exchange of liaison officers; visits of staff at the working-level between the different headquarters; joint training of staff in the field of prevention; building specific links to civil society (including the media and professional groups) to increase awareness of the value of prevention; and similar measures to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this context, the need for mobilizing effective resources for early warning and preventive activities was stressed.

8. One possible means of follow-up would be for working-level meetings of the staff of the United Nations and regional organizations to be convened to develop further the modalities for interaction and collaboration discussed at the meeting. The United Nations will be prepared to convene the first such meeting before the end of 1998. The value of periodic high-level meetings between the United Nations and regional organizations was also recognized, and it was agreed that such meetings should continue to be convened in the future.

9. I very much hope that this summary has captured the essence of our meeting and I would welcome your observations.



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21 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter from His Excellency Bishop Gobrial Roric, State Minister at the Ministry of External Relations, on the flagrant American aggression against the Sudan. His Excellency the State Minister requests the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting to discuss this matter and to take the necessary measures to ensure the non-recurrence of such criminal acts of aggression.

(Signed) Elfatih M. A. ERWA
Permanent Representative



Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 21 August 1998 from the Minister of State at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to
the President of the Security Council

1. I wish to inform you that at precisely 7.30 p.m. on Friday, 20 August 1998, my country was subjected to aerial aggression by the United States of America in the form of a rocket attack on the Shafa human and veterinary medicines factory in the industrial district of the city of Khartoum. The attack totally destroyed the installation, injured a number of its employees and terrified the inhabitants of the surrounding residential districts.
2. As you are well aware, the Government of the United States of America declared its responsibility for this iniquitous act of aggression which is a clear and blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a Member State of the United Nations, and is contrary to international law and practice, the Charter of the United Nations and civilized human behaviour.
3. The site that was attacked was a factory producing medicines for human and veterinary use, wholly owned by the private sector and financed by a number of Sudanese investors and by the Bank of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Its output provides over 50 per cent of the Sudan's requirements in terms of medicines for human use, in particular basic and life-saving medicines, part of its output being exported to several neighbouring countries. A number of foreign officials from various countries of the world, and ambassadors accredited to Khartoum, had visited this factory which was regarded as a model of joint regional investment and funding.
4. The allegations made in statements by the United States to the effect that the factory was owned by Osama bin Laden, and that it produced chemical weapons and poisonous gases used for terrorist purposes, are totally devoid of truth, and the Government of the United States of America has no evidence to support such allegations. The United States Government, which still has diplomatic relations with the Sudan, had not expressed any doubts through diplomatic channels specifically concerning this installation, in spite of its repeated and unfounded accusations against the Sudan. Full information concerning the ownership of this factory and the nature of its output is available, and the Government of the Sudan is fully prepared to provide information to the Council, or to any other body mandated by it for that purpose, and it is also ready to receive a mission from the Council to visit the site, consult the documentation and establish all the various aspects of the facts.
5. The repeated attempts by the Government of the United States of America to implicate the Sudan in cases of international terrorism are not supported by any evidence or proof, and the Government of the United States has not submitted any material evidence in support of these allegations against the Sudan. On the other hand, the Government of the Sudan, confident of the soundness of its well-

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established position, entailing the rejection of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and of the perpetrators of terrorism, has persistently asked the United States Government to cooperate with it by submitting any evidence or information to enable the two sides to resolve this issue in a spirit of cooperation and with the required degree of transparency; however, the United States Government has constantly been reluctant to make any serious study of this issue and has continued to make random accusations and allegations and to use them, as circumstances required, to defame the Sudan's reputation, to damage its relations with other States and to attempt to force a break in relations and to impose unjust sanctions on it.

6. It may be considered strange that the Government of the United States, in spite of its numerous allegations against the Sudan and the ongoing communications between the two sides through diplomatic channels, has never previously expressed any doubts or made any accusations concerning this installation, its ownership or the nature of its output in spite of the fact that it was open to its diplomatic mission, or to its representative, to visit the factory and to gather any information concerning it from its owners or from competent government agencies. This factory had been approved by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) (the Iraqi sanctions committee) to export medical products to Iraq in the framework of the oil-for-food project.

7. The conduct of the United States in making accusations and uttering denunciations and then imposing sanctions on sovereign countries, without recourse to the institutions of the international community, is a dangerous form of behaviour and a blatant infringement of the principles of the United Nations and its Charter; it drags modern society back to the laws of the jungle governed solely by the logic of force whereby each State is intent on taking the law into its own hands, a situation which will ultimately threaten international peace and security.

8. It is ironic that the United States administration has justified its aggression as an act of self-defence, in which connection it has cited Article 51 of the Charter. The Sudan considers that justification to be naïve, illogical and baseless since it has not committed any action that could be regarded as an attack or a threat against the United States of America. The Sudan has always denounced terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the basis of lofty principles of Islam, and humanitarian principles, particularly condemning the abominable crime committed in the territory of two friendly States, Kenya and Tanzania, which caused the death of a number of Africans and United States citizens; the Sudan announced its readiness to cooperate with those two friendly African States to identify the perpetrators of this crime and bring them to justice. In spite of that and even though the investigations have still not been completed, the United States of America has suddenly launched an unjustified terrorist attack on innocent and defenceless citizens in the Sudan, and on the modest infrastructure which they had built up to combat disease and poverty.

9. The Sudan regards these acts of terrorist aggression as a betrayal of those innocent victims and their families; it is a desperate attempt by the faltering United States leadership to distract attention from its mendacity and the moral

scandals to which the people of the United States, and the people of the whole world, have been witness. The United States administration has fabricated new lies, the product of a sick imagination, and has aimed at imaginary targets, causing innocent victims, instead of displaying wisdom and behaving fairly and rationally to pursue and discover those responsible for the crimes in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Lying has become a characteristic feature of the United States administration, but it has overstepped the limits by threatening world peace and targeting innocent people both in the developing countries and other countries, which is an affront to the human conscience.

10. On this basis, the Sudan requests the Security Council to take its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations by condemning this barbarous and iniquitous aggression and holding the United States of America responsible for all the material damage and human casualties of this aggression and to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent any repetition. Accordingly, the Sudan requests you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to look into this aggression and to send a technical mission of inquiry to establish the facts of the United States allegations and to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that there is no recurrence and to preserve the security and peace of my country.

11. I assure you once again of our readiness to provide the Council with all data and information that it may need to study this matter in all its aspects.

(Signed) Gobrial RORIC

Enclosure

[Original: English]

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES**SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990)
CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT****S/AC.25/1998/986/OC.1401
OC. ONE FOUR ZERO ONE****13 January 1998
NOT VALID AFTER 12 July 1998**

Sir,

In reply to your communication dated 23/12/97 (S/AC.25/1998/986/Comm.1401, ref. SUGA.1-1/4/986/NO.2), I have the honour to inform you that the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait has been duly notified of the intention to send the following shipment of supplies through the border crossing point/port of Trebil to Iraq:

Line Item Number	HS Tariff Code	GOODS TO BE SHIPPED	Quantity	Unit Of Measure
1	0	SHIFZOLE 2.5% (ALBNDAZOLE 2.5% FOR LEVAMISOLE) 1 LITRE/BOTT	100,000	BOTTLE

The exporter is eligible for payment from the Iraq account as the financing arrangements specified in your communication appear to be consistent with the procedures adopted by the Committee pursuant to Security Council resolution 986 (1995).

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



**Antonio Monteiro
Chairman**

**Security Council Committee
established by resolution 661(1990)
concerning the situation between
Iraq and Kuwait**

**His Excellency
Mr. Elfath Mohamed Ahmed Erwa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Sudan
to the United Nations**